In a
scenario featuring capital outflows, possible reactions by the monetary
authority in the framework of ROM mechanism -- in a bid to play a balancing
role in terms of FX liquidity -- are provided below. Considering the prevailing
state of affairs, option (b) appears to us as the most viable course of
action:
(a)
The CBT reduces the ROC, and FX reserves kept by the banks with the CBT
decline. As a result, FX supply in the market increases; TRL liquidity remains
constant; and the intervention is aimed more at the volatility -- rather than
the level -- of the TRL. This is similar to a sterilised FX intervention.
As regards monetary stance and credits, it would correspond to an easing.
(b)
As an alternative to a change in ROC, the reserve option rate may be
reduced. In such a situation, because the FX reserves banks may keep with
the CBT would decrease, this would foster FX supply in the market. On the other
hand, TRL liquidity would tighten and the deprecation of the TRL would be
limited. This may be considered as a mechanism comparable with a non-sterilised
FX intervention, which is aimed more at the level -- rather than the volatility
-- of the TRL. As regards monetary stance and credits, it would amount to a tightening.
(c)
The CBT cuts the FX RRR, and FX reserves kept by the banks with the CBT
decline. As a result, FX supply in the market increases; TRL liquidity remains
constant; and the intervention is aimed more at the volatility -- rather than
the level -- of the TRL. This is similar to a sterilised FX sale
intervention. As regards monetary stance and credits, it would correspond
to an easing.
August MPC Meeting: Door left open
for further monetary tightening… At the previous meeting, the
CBT had hiked the upper band of the interest rate corridor by 50bp to 7.75%,
while leaving the lower band and the policy rate stable at 3.5% and 4.5%,
respectively. However, the interest rate on borrowing facilities provided to
primary dealers was kept unchanged at 6.75%. In other words, the CBT continued
to provide funding to primary dealers at 6.75% on “normal” days, but the
funding rate would increase to as high as 7.75% on “exceptional” days. In the
statement, the CBT left the door open for further monetary tightening by
reiterating the following: i) “cautious stance will be maintained until
inflation outlook is in line with medium-term targets”; ii) “additional
monetary tightening will be implemented when necessary”.
Currency tumbles: CBT changes tactics… As
the TRL came under major selling pressure and bond yields soared in the
aftermath of the MPC meeting, Governor Basci held a press briefing, where he
unveiled the new monetary stance, along with a shot of verbal intervention in
FX (pronounced year-end US$/TRL level as 1.92). The new stance envisages eliminating
the “uncertainty in interest rates” i.e. the CBT will implement a predictable
monetary policy, which is expected to foster interest rate stability. As we
already know, this implies that all rates (policy and corridor) will remain
stable until further notice, and cost of CBT funding may vary within a range of
6.75 – 7.75%.
Principal objective: to mitigate
sensitivity of TRL interest rates to global rates -- The monetary
authority sought to achieve this via breaking the negative feedback loop between rate hike expectations and
domestic currency depreciation. By doing so, the CBT tried to insulate
domestic markets from volatility generated by data surprises driven by Fed
tapering. In the presentations published after this communication, the CBT
described this strategy as follows: “Predictability of Turkish lira
liquidity policies are increased, while dependence on high frequency data is
eliminated.” As we had commented earlier, the main aim is to attract interest in local bonds by fixing the
funding rate, and we think the short-end of the bond yield curve would benefit
the most from this stance.
However, the
flipside of this policy would inevitably be higher FX volatility, which
means continued depreciation pressure on the TRL, at least until the Fed
provides clear policy messages. Since the CBT will not use the interest rate
weapon against the exchange rate, this strategy requires additional instruments
providing FX and LC liquidity. Since we surmise there are no new tools (swap,
option or forward) to defend the TRL, CBT officials pinpointed the Bank’s FX
reserves as a main defence mechanism. According to Deputy
Governor Kenc, the CBT could use not only net FX reserves (US$40bn), but also
most of the gross FX reserves (FX ROM US$32.1bn and FX RRR US$28.1bn) if need
be. In that regard, first of all the CBT will continue to inject
liquidity through daily FX selling auctions and be “offensive”. Moreover, CBT
officials suggested that FX liquidity would be provided from gross reserves via
ROM and FX required reserves, if needed.
In fact, the CBT expects the
TRL and LC interest rates to adjust -- on the back of greater interest on
the part of foreign investors in local bonds -- after having overshot
initially. This expectation is discernible also from the recent presentation (Governor Basci’s Presentation at OMFIF Meeting on "The Role of
Emerging Market Economies in Building World Prosperity"); i.e. sections
devoted to bond yields and REER. Regarding yields, Governor Basci described the
current situation as an “overreaction”, voicing his expectation for “mean
reversion”, which implies around 100-125bp fall in 3m and 2y yields from the
levels observed on September 2.
Betting on mean reversion: viable, yet
risky… The “overreaction” message for the TRL was
communicated through the projected level of the Real Effective Exchange Rate
(REER) Index, and a new lower bound was added to stress the undervaluation of the
TRL. We
already knew that the CBT had drawn a red line for the TRL’s overvaluation,
referring to the trend line of 2% annual appreciation that starts with the
index base (May 2003=100) and reaches around 120 level this year. This has been
considered an upper bound for the REER throughout the year. Conversely, the new line sets a lower bound
for the “fair” value of the REER, drawn by starting from the initial value (Jan
2003=90) of that index and with the same appreciation trend. Based on the CBT’s
calculations, September REER may dip far below the new line, assuming the
exchange rates (FX basket 2.38 against TRL) prevailing at the early days of
September being sustained throughout the month. The graph denotes the CBT’s expectations for mean reversion in an
uncertain timeframe. We believe the now famous 1.92 level for the US$/TRL is a product of this exercise. Nevertheless, at the Ankara CBT-Investor
meeting, Deputy Governor Kenc sought to downplay the significance of
this parity, claiming this was merely an example to underline the fact that EM
currencies typically appreciate after underperforming, and this is bound to
happen to the TRL as well in an uncertain timeframe.
In our understanding, the
CBT is first introducing a shock to trigger an overshoot in the FX market, and
then betting on mean reversion. We continue to view this as a feasible, albeit
risky strategy, predicated apparently on the assumption of a possible
relief to follow the resolution of the Fed policy uncertainty with the
September 17-18 meeting.