ACHIEVEMENTS
Volatile money market rates and intentional ambiguity on policy stance As a result of the policy rate cuts and widening interest rate corridor, rates in the secondary market for repos fluctuated intensely and deviated from the policy rate for a longer period of time. Within November-December 2010, the 10-day average of the O/N repo and 1m swap rates hovered below the policy rate. Meanwhile, the CBT left the door open for additional rate cuts, a move that we feel was intended to impede a clear understanding of the Bank’s policy stance, hence to make any positioning more difficult.
Heavy outflows from short-term bets; partial shift to longer maturities Based on the BRSA’s off-balance sheet data for the banks, cumulative outflows from Turkish markets have reached US$11.5bn in between the MPC meeting held in November and the end of February. Short-term fund outflows are noted to be mainly the result of the closure of money market positions of the non-residents, in the form of swaps, deposits, repos and credit transactions. A partial return of these flows caused a shift in non-residents’ positions within November 2010 – February 2011 in favour of longer maturities, mainly through accumulation of domestic debt instruments.
Banks’ reliance on short-term funds is on the rise; so is the interest rate risk... Before the recent agressive hike, the CBT increased TRL reserve requirement ratio (RRR) gradually three times and withdrew TL19.5bn cumulatively. This has brought the CBT funding through 1w repo auctions to the TL25-30bn range recently. Since the March RRR hike will have taken effect on April 15, 2011, liquidity to the tune of about TL19.1bn will be withdrawn from the market and will pull the total funding from the CBT up to the TL45-50bn range. Contrary to speculations about insufficient liquidity injections by the CBT, we think the monetary authority needs to provide the liquidity demanded in the market, to
maintain money market rates close to the policy rate. However, banks will become more dependent on very short-term Central Bank resources despite additional funding. Hence, even when banks’ loan levels remain unchanged, their maturity mismatch
will increase. Banks will have to reflect the additional interest rate risk to their loan rates and/or scale back their loan portfolios.
FAILURES
Decline in TRL deposit rates; no increase in TRL loan rates...Banks had the chance to scale down the interest rate of the deposit whose cost had increased, given full substitutability of short-term Central Bank funds with deposits. Thus, the rise in the cost reflected more on deposit rates than on loan rates, at least before the latest hike in RRR.
Although this 400bp increase may be a game changer, the data on the average interest rate on loans for the March 25 week, when the MPC meeting took place, are not promising. Only the interest rate on commercial loans increased by a considerable
37bp to 8.78%. While the cash and vehicle loan interest rates even declined by 7bp and 5bp to 11.97% and 10.51%, respectively, the interest rate on housing loans increased by an insignificant 3bp to 9.76%.
Loan growth is still strong on all metrics...
Despite all the measures adopted, the slowdown in loan growth is still not significant, as total loans are increasing at an annual rate of 41% and consumer loans at 35% as of March 25. We also think the exchange rate effect on FX loans should be neutralised by using fixed FX rates against the TRL and a fixed
currency (60% US$-40% €) composition. We took the last 22 business days’ average of total loans (fixed FX rates and fixed FX composition) to represent the monthly outlook and compared it with the average of the same period a year ago. The annual
increase in our indicator is still high at 34.7% as of end-March.
Where to henceforth?
Too early to call a cease-fire... Considering the achievements versus failures of the CBT’s policy mix, it would be somewhat premature, in our view, to expect the monetary authority to refrain from adopting further tightening measures, until there is conclusive evidence of a slowdown in loan volume and domestic demand.
The Central Bank bought time; but the window of opportunity is a narrow one... The CBT expects the restrictive effects of these policy measures to be observed with a lag, possibly starting with the second quarter. The monetary authority also bought time by launching front-loaded RRR hikes with its recent move. Moreover, it called for supplementary macro-prudential measures targeting credit supply from other institutions (read as BRSA) to extend the wait-and-see period. However, this window of opportunity is not wide open: now is the time to observe more concrete developments (rise in deposit and loan rates) -- even before the major liquidity withdrawal takes place.
CBT drives short-term rates up; pressures the banks... As one of the channels (cost) for transmission of RR is not working, the CBT relied heavily on the other (liquidity) channel. Further liquidity withdrawal on April 15 and a wider interest rate corridor provide the CBT with the opportunity to drive O/N rates wherever it wants them to be. Within November-December, the CBT’s aim was to discourage portfolio inflows; hence, O/N rates fell sharply. But now, the main concern is relentless loan growth; so the CBT is driving the rates to the upper limit (Primary Dealers Facility, which is at 8% vs. policy rate of 6.25%) of the interest rate corridor. However, we need to acknowledge that this cannot be a permanent strategy in an Inflation Targeting regime, where the Central Bank has to provide the liquidity demanded in the market, to maintain money market rates close to the policy rate. Otherwise, the policy rate will lose its significance as a reference rate.
Is it early for FX RR hike?... Up until now, the CBT used TRL RRR as its main policy tool. However, now the average weighted RRR stands at 13.4%, higher than the uniform FX RRR of 11%. Meanwhile, banks increased their FX deposit rates and were granted permission to issue FX bonds. This creates the perception that RRR hikes in FX deposits might be in the pipeline. Also as expected, the coverage of the liabilities subject to RRR may be expanded and the RRRs may be differentiated according to the nature and maturity of liabilities, including the off-balance sheet liabilities (mainly swaps) of the banking system. We do not
think we are there yet, especially in terms of RRR hikes that withdraw FX liquidity, since banks are still not comfortable, as the “claims from abroad” account has halved to US$12.5bn during the hot money outflows and remained at that level since then.
Swap RR also likely... On the other hand, we have been observing inflows through swap transactions since the start of March, due to attractive money market rates. Over the last four weeks, cumulative inflows have amounted to US$8.8bn, corresponding to almost 70% of the outflows within November-March. Since March 4, the TRL has appreciated by 5.7% against the US$. This picture could compel the CBT to act by broadening the coverage of liabilities subject to RR to include off-balance sheet items.
New Governor, Old Bank... As the quarterly inflation report will be published in April, the MPC meeting on 21 April, under the presidency of the new governor, has become more crucial. As a reminder, the CBT’s baseline scenario in the previous report envisaged a gradual tightening this year by changing the mix of the policy rate and RRRs. According to the CBT, monetary tightening could be implemented either through RRRs or policy rates, or a combination of both. Until now, the RRR leg of the policy mix has been used and its impact through the liquidity channel has been relied upon. Although we do not expect further TRL RR hikes in the short-term, we see some room if necessary and expect the usage of untapped FX related measures
including FX buying auctions. However, in the absence of any meaningful slowdown in loan growth and domestic demand, despite all the measures taken to date and discussed above, the recent positive inflation outlook could only delay an inevitable
policy rate increase by a few months.
19 Nisan 2011 Salı
16 Mart 2011 Çarşamba
A US$10bn Question...
CBT expounds on fund flows; this time in greater detail... Data flow regarding the financing of the current account deficit within Nov’10-Jan’11 was not consistent with the trend in the TRL, which in the same period remained under heavy pressure against major currencies, depreciating almost 12%. Indeed, there were no significant outflows from the conventional portfolio channels that the balance of payments could cover. Furthermore, net errors & omissions item showed US$5.7bn inflow over the last three months. Although this item represents flows that cannot be recorded in finance accounts and is calculated as a residual, it is usually considered hot money. Consequently, several articles appeared in the local press, claiming that the Central Bank of Turkey’s new policy mix that was aimed at deterring short-term capital flows to Turkey had proved ineffective, defying claims by the Bank. The CBT promptly responded in a press statement: “...Following resolutions adopted by the Central Bank of Turkey Monetary Policy Committee during and after the November 2010 meeting, such as widening of the interest rate corridor and cuts in policy rates, some outflows of short-term funds have been noted. Based on the CBT’s calculations, cumulative outflows from Turkish markets have exceeded US$10bn in between the MPC meeting held in November and the end of December. Short-term fund outflows are noted to be mainly the result of the closure of money market positions of the non-residents, in the form of swaps, deposits, repos and credit transactions. Although these transactions are reflected to balance of payment (BoP) statistics, swap transactions in particular, which constitute the bulk of the money market positions, cannot be monitored via BoP statistics. On the other hand, since the beginning of 2011, the CBT has been observing daily fluctuations in non-resident portfolio volumes, driven by global risk perceptions and international developments. The CBT has also acknowledged a shift in non-residents’ positions within November 2010 – Feb 2011 in favour of longer maturities, mainly through accumulation of domestic debt instruments...” However, this explanation apparently failed to convincingly rebut the counter-arguments, as the CBT had not backed its statement with concrete evidence on money market positions. As such, a few days later, the monetary authority had to elaborate on fund flows in more detail and to support its case this time with figures.
Where are hot money flows headed to and how to monitor them? -- First, the CBT specified three channels for non-residents’ portfolio flows: equities, debt instruments, and money market transactions. As we all know, the first two channels can be easily monitored from the CBT’s database (Non-residents' Holdings of Securities) on a weekly basis and from BoP statistics on a monthly basis. However, as mentioned in the above statement as well, swap transactions in particular, which constitute the bulk -- and are the most volatile component -- of the money market positions, cannot be monitored via BoP statistics. Secondly, a major difference from the previous statement was the indication provided by the CBT to monitor such flows. The CBT pointed out that the off-balance sheet FX position of the banking system could be an important indicator of the magnitude of these transactions. Developments on the off-balance sheet FX position of the banking system can be monitored through the weekly bulletins of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Unlike many others, we have been aware of these figures and have been following their evolution for many years now to better comprehend the TRL’s performance amid hectic market conditions. Let us explain here what off-balance sheet FX position stands for and what its implications are for the TRL.
As is known, since Turkey switched to the floating exchange rate regime in 2001, the banking sector’s net open F/X position has been close to zero, while there is even a surplus, according to the latest data. On the other hand, banks are offsetting their on-balance sheet open position at US$12.3bn as of March 4, by taking long positions via off-balance sheet transactions (derivatives) of similar amounts. Swaps with foreign residents are known to be making up a major portion (60%) of the off-balance-sheet transactions and 75% of these derivative transactions were on currency, according to the September 2010 issue of the FX Risk Evaluation Report of the BRSA. Currency swaps include the exchange of the TRL and major currencies between domestic banks and foreign investors. It provides foreign investors the opportunity to take TRL positions without assuming the country risk. Especially, long term swaps had been used to hedge long-term domestic housing loans during 2005-06 by our local banks.
Implications for the TRL -- So how can we interpret a change in the off-balance sheet FX position? Simple… When there is an increase (decrease) in the off-balance position, it eventually means a rise (fall) in money market positions in the TRL by foreigners. It also places appreciation (depreciation) pressure on the domestic currency.
Let us continue with the November-December evolution of these figures. Moreover, we will be looking at recent numbers to evaluate the current outlook of short-term capital flows. According to the BRSA’s weekly data, off-balance sheet FX position fell by US$10.5bn within the Nov 12 – Dec 31, 2010 period, lending support to the CBT’s argument on hot money outflows and the effectiveness of the decisions.
Although the direction of the flows has changed more often year-to-date in 2011, there have still been outflows of around US$1.3bn cumulatively as of March 4. As a result, total money market outflows have reached US$11.5bn since the beginning of November. However, there have been US$7.2bn inflows to domestic debt instruments in the same period, mostly during the first months of 2011, and US$1.9bn outflows from equity portfolios. Central Bank Governor Yilmaz also acknowledged this, saying that following their statement concerning “US$10 billion worth of outflows”, "a majority" of those positions had returned. But much of the returning money appeared to be invested in longer term instruments, which was their main goal.
Note that the above analysis has a certain margin of error, since the data are not compiled through conventional investment channels. Nevertheless, we think it is a valuable exercise to understand the recent trends.
Where are hot money flows headed to and how to monitor them? -- First, the CBT specified three channels for non-residents’ portfolio flows: equities, debt instruments, and money market transactions. As we all know, the first two channels can be easily monitored from the CBT’s database (Non-residents' Holdings of Securities) on a weekly basis and from BoP statistics on a monthly basis. However, as mentioned in the above statement as well, swap transactions in particular, which constitute the bulk -- and are the most volatile component -- of the money market positions, cannot be monitored via BoP statistics. Secondly, a major difference from the previous statement was the indication provided by the CBT to monitor such flows. The CBT pointed out that the off-balance sheet FX position of the banking system could be an important indicator of the magnitude of these transactions. Developments on the off-balance sheet FX position of the banking system can be monitored through the weekly bulletins of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. Unlike many others, we have been aware of these figures and have been following their evolution for many years now to better comprehend the TRL’s performance amid hectic market conditions. Let us explain here what off-balance sheet FX position stands for and what its implications are for the TRL.
As is known, since Turkey switched to the floating exchange rate regime in 2001, the banking sector’s net open F/X position has been close to zero, while there is even a surplus, according to the latest data. On the other hand, banks are offsetting their on-balance sheet open position at US$12.3bn as of March 4, by taking long positions via off-balance sheet transactions (derivatives) of similar amounts. Swaps with foreign residents are known to be making up a major portion (60%) of the off-balance-sheet transactions and 75% of these derivative transactions were on currency, according to the September 2010 issue of the FX Risk Evaluation Report of the BRSA. Currency swaps include the exchange of the TRL and major currencies between domestic banks and foreign investors. It provides foreign investors the opportunity to take TRL positions without assuming the country risk. Especially, long term swaps had been used to hedge long-term domestic housing loans during 2005-06 by our local banks.
Implications for the TRL -- So how can we interpret a change in the off-balance sheet FX position? Simple… When there is an increase (decrease) in the off-balance position, it eventually means a rise (fall) in money market positions in the TRL by foreigners. It also places appreciation (depreciation) pressure on the domestic currency.
Let us continue with the November-December evolution of these figures. Moreover, we will be looking at recent numbers to evaluate the current outlook of short-term capital flows. According to the BRSA’s weekly data, off-balance sheet FX position fell by US$10.5bn within the Nov 12 – Dec 31, 2010 period, lending support to the CBT’s argument on hot money outflows and the effectiveness of the decisions.
Although the direction of the flows has changed more often year-to-date in 2011, there have still been outflows of around US$1.3bn cumulatively as of March 4. As a result, total money market outflows have reached US$11.5bn since the beginning of November. However, there have been US$7.2bn inflows to domestic debt instruments in the same period, mostly during the first months of 2011, and US$1.9bn outflows from equity portfolios. Central Bank Governor Yilmaz also acknowledged this, saying that following their statement concerning “US$10 billion worth of outflows”, "a majority" of those positions had returned. But much of the returning money appeared to be invested in longer term instruments, which was their main goal.
Note that the above analysis has a certain margin of error, since the data are not compiled through conventional investment channels. Nevertheless, we think it is a valuable exercise to understand the recent trends.
25 Şubat 2011 Cuma
Is the CBT done, or yet to start?...
Turkey needs a re-coupling of growth drivers - After an impressive growth performance in 2010, thanks mainly to a robust recovery in domestic demand, it is clear that Turkey needs to rebalance its growth drivers in the face of mounting risks threatening the sustainability of this outperformance. Our C/A deficit, the speed limit of the economy, has widened rapidly, while the recent trend in oil and other commodity prices has definitely not been of any help in terms of stemming this rise. Luckily, the government and the CBT seem cognisant of the situation and have taken certain measures to restrain the pace of the recovery in loans and eventually domestic demand over the coming period, while hoping that the role to be played by the banking system in the monetary transmission mechanism would be supportive. Moreover, in order to quantify and commit these targets, the CBT has assumed a limited monetary tightening to bring loan growth down to 20-25% in 2011, which supports its YE11 CPI forecast (5.9%), as stipulated in its Jan’11 Inflation Report.
Government keen to restrain loan growth - Deputy PM Babacan also cautioned further measures were to follow in case of no slowdown in credit growth within 1Q11, as he stated that additional measures should be expected if loan growth persisted at 35-40% annually within January-March. He reiterated that a loan growth rate of 20-25% would be reasonable and in line with the government’s GDP growth target of 4.5-5.0% for 2011. He further noted that some bank-specific measures could also be applied, if necessary. Such a strong degree of commitment to limit loan growth renders this indicator even more critical than usual. Hence, it is essential for economists and analysts to gauge whether there is a slowdown in loan growth or not.
Are inferences of “no slowdown in loan growth” well-founded? Unfortunately, there are different sources (BRSA, CBT) and definitions (bank-only, consolidated) for loan figures and market players do not know exactly on which parameters the CBT or other authorities are basing their assessments, in the absence of an official announcement. Experts inferring that there is “no slowdown in loan growth” are usually predicating this conclusion on the BRSA’s weekly figures on an annual basis, but without making the necessary adjustments. Indeed, as of Feb 11, on a year-on-year basis, total loans outstanding were up 36%, while consumer loans were higher by 40%, showing no signs of a deceleration. However, first of all, a direct comparison with the year ago could be misleading due to the weak base. Secondly, the exchange rate effect on FX loans should be neutralised by using fixed FX rates against the TRL and a fixed currency (60% US$-40% €) composition. Last but not least, short term changes are more descriptive in terms of detecting trend changes. We have tried to refrain from those mistakes and used the BRSA’s loan figures from its daily bulletin, which come with less of a lag. We took the last 22 business days’ average of total loans (fixed FX rates and fixed FX composition) to represent the monthly outlook and compared it with the same period’s average of a year ago. The annual increase in our indicator is still high at 33.7% as of February 17, but it signifies a slight deceleration in the trend towards 33.6% as of mid-February, after having peaked at 33.8% within January. The CBT also acknowledged this, noting that there was a slight deceleration in the pace of credit growth at the beginning of 2011 in the summary of the MPC meeting notes. It also pointed to a slowdown in consumer loans, given sluggish auto loans, in another paragraph of the report.
There are other signs pointing to a deceleration in economic activity, which make our observation of a slowdown in the pace of credit growth more meaningful. First of all, seasonally-adjusted imports fell by 6.4% m/m in December. Moreover, VAT on imports item in the central government budget signified some deceleration in the pace of import growth in January. VAT on imports dropped by 5% yoy in TRL terms, corresponding to a 10% yoy decline in US$ terms. According to our calculations, this implies an import level of around US$14bn for Jan’11, reducing the annual growth of imports down to 15-20% from 37% in Dec’10. In that case, the trade deficit and hence the C/A deficit would continue to widen in annualised terms, but at a decelerating pace. Second, two of the most important leading indicators of economic activity showed some weakness in February. Capacity utilisation rate (CUR) fell further to 73.0%, while the Business Confidence Index of the CBT retreated after the impressive improvement of a month ago. CUR declined to 73.0% in Feb’11, the lowest level registered since Aug’10. Feb’11 CUR reading fell short of both the expectations and the average CUR (75.6%) of 4Q10. However, the seasonally-adjusted CUR of 76.1% indicated a more limited deterioration than what the headline figures suggested. Business Confidence Index slipped to 111.0 in Feb’11 from 113.6 in Jan’11, on the back of the fall in total orders in the last three months and that in export orders for the next three months. Yet, the current level is still much higher than the critical threshold of 100 -- which separates the expansion and contraction periods in the economy -- thereby attesting to the ongoing economic growth. While being a negative surprise for growth outlook, it was definitely another source of relief for recent overheating concerns. CUR turned out much weaker than expected, driven by lower CUR in consumption and capital goods. Despite its being still relatively stronger on a seasonally-adjusted basis, weak CUR supports the CBT’s stance on the existence of a negative output gap (around 1% of GDP) in the economy. Business confidence index implies that the growth momentum is also losing some steam, probably reflecting the measures taken by the Central Bank and other authorities.
On the consumer side, available leading indicators of domestic demand (domestic car sales and white goods sales) were strong in January. However, more forward-looking indicators such as consumer confidence have somewhat weakened, due to a deterioration in expectations. Recognising the above-mentioned developments, the CBT also acknowledged early signs of a slowdown that are discernible through various channels. The CBT sees an improvement in the current account deficit in December in seasonally-adjusted terms, as well as a slight deceleration in the pace of credit growth at the beginning of 2011. The monetary authority also indicates that monetary tightening would restrain demand side pressures on inflation, by citing that domestic orders have moderated during the first quarter compared to the previous quarter, according to leading indicators (business confidence sub index).
For the time being, the final supporting factor is the favourable performance of the central government budget in January. The budget posted a TRL4.81bn primary surplus in Jan’11, compared to a TRL2.97bn primary surplus in Jan’10, up 62% yoy. Similarly, a TRL1bn budget surplus was recorded in Jan’11, versus TRL3.1bn deficit in the same month last year. Budget revenues rose by 20.4% yoy, thanks to solid performances in both tax and non-tax revenues. On the other hand, budget expenditures declined by 0.7% yoy, thanks to lower interest expenses in Jan’11. Otherwise, non-interest expenditures rose by 12.9% yoy, at a slightly slower pace than the tax revenues. It was really a good start to 2011 in terms of fiscal discipline ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for June’11. 12-month rolling budget figures imply that the primary balance improved slightly to 1% of the GDP from 0.8% of the GDP, while the budget deficit declined from 3.6% of the GDP to 3.2% of the GDP. Excluding one-off factors such as privatisation revenues, the primary balance also shows about 0.1pp improvement as a percentage of the GDP.
All in all, these signals bode well for the success of the CBT’s recent strategy. However, we agree with the CBT that the available data are not long enough to make a healthy assessment, as the effects of the measures would be observed more significantly with some lag.
Therefore, we think the CBT is seemingly trying to buy time before making any adjustments to the policy mix. However, the CBT also sees early signs of a slowdown and expects a further deceleration in economic activity. This should suggest that the CBT would be in no hurry to further increase the reserve requirement ratios (RRRs) or would be even more likely to hold them at current levels for a longer period, in case the impact of the measures became more visible. We maintain our expectation of a 100bp policy rate hike in 4Q and a 150bp RRR hike (weighted average) in the first half of the year. However, if the “slowdown” scenario pans out, this would lessen the chances of further RRR hikes and render the policy rate decision dependent more on inflation outlook than before.
On the other hand, we see a slight downside risk (*) to our GDP growth forecast of 6%for 2011, to which the current weakness in leading indicators would pose a threat should it evolve into a trend. We also see a limited upside risk to our CPI forecast of 6.2% for 2011, as oil prices are hovering about US$10-15 above our assumption. Our back of the envelope calculations suggest that the direct impact of every US$5 increase in average oil prices would be a 0.2pp rise in annual inflation. It would also mean a US$4.8-7.2bn (**) addition to our C/A deficit forecast of US$57.0bn, if the recent elevated oil price levels are sustained.
(*) In 2011, we assume seasonally-adjusted m/m changes in industrial production (IP) as 0.3% on average after a likely retreat of 2-3% m/m in January due to the sharp improvement in December. We think our assumption is very conservative, since average m/m changes were 0.8% and 1.4% in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Based on our calculations, even with this moderate improvement in industrial production, GDP growth could easily reach or even slightly exceed 6% in 2011.
(**) Oil and derivatives imports (US$21bn) constitute 54.5% of total energy imports (US$38.5bn) in 2010. Natural gas and solid fuels comprise the remainder. For simplicity, we assumed similar price increases in those segments. Oil and derivatives imports rise by around US$1.3bn in every US$10 increase in average oil prices
Government keen to restrain loan growth - Deputy PM Babacan also cautioned further measures were to follow in case of no slowdown in credit growth within 1Q11, as he stated that additional measures should be expected if loan growth persisted at 35-40% annually within January-March. He reiterated that a loan growth rate of 20-25% would be reasonable and in line with the government’s GDP growth target of 4.5-5.0% for 2011. He further noted that some bank-specific measures could also be applied, if necessary. Such a strong degree of commitment to limit loan growth renders this indicator even more critical than usual. Hence, it is essential for economists and analysts to gauge whether there is a slowdown in loan growth or not.
Are inferences of “no slowdown in loan growth” well-founded? Unfortunately, there are different sources (BRSA, CBT) and definitions (bank-only, consolidated) for loan figures and market players do not know exactly on which parameters the CBT or other authorities are basing their assessments, in the absence of an official announcement. Experts inferring that there is “no slowdown in loan growth” are usually predicating this conclusion on the BRSA’s weekly figures on an annual basis, but without making the necessary adjustments. Indeed, as of Feb 11, on a year-on-year basis, total loans outstanding were up 36%, while consumer loans were higher by 40%, showing no signs of a deceleration. However, first of all, a direct comparison with the year ago could be misleading due to the weak base. Secondly, the exchange rate effect on FX loans should be neutralised by using fixed FX rates against the TRL and a fixed currency (60% US$-40% €) composition. Last but not least, short term changes are more descriptive in terms of detecting trend changes. We have tried to refrain from those mistakes and used the BRSA’s loan figures from its daily bulletin, which come with less of a lag. We took the last 22 business days’ average of total loans (fixed FX rates and fixed FX composition) to represent the monthly outlook and compared it with the same period’s average of a year ago. The annual increase in our indicator is still high at 33.7% as of February 17, but it signifies a slight deceleration in the trend towards 33.6% as of mid-February, after having peaked at 33.8% within January. The CBT also acknowledged this, noting that there was a slight deceleration in the pace of credit growth at the beginning of 2011 in the summary of the MPC meeting notes. It also pointed to a slowdown in consumer loans, given sluggish auto loans, in another paragraph of the report.
There are other signs pointing to a deceleration in economic activity, which make our observation of a slowdown in the pace of credit growth more meaningful. First of all, seasonally-adjusted imports fell by 6.4% m/m in December. Moreover, VAT on imports item in the central government budget signified some deceleration in the pace of import growth in January. VAT on imports dropped by 5% yoy in TRL terms, corresponding to a 10% yoy decline in US$ terms. According to our calculations, this implies an import level of around US$14bn for Jan’11, reducing the annual growth of imports down to 15-20% from 37% in Dec’10. In that case, the trade deficit and hence the C/A deficit would continue to widen in annualised terms, but at a decelerating pace. Second, two of the most important leading indicators of economic activity showed some weakness in February. Capacity utilisation rate (CUR) fell further to 73.0%, while the Business Confidence Index of the CBT retreated after the impressive improvement of a month ago. CUR declined to 73.0% in Feb’11, the lowest level registered since Aug’10. Feb’11 CUR reading fell short of both the expectations and the average CUR (75.6%) of 4Q10. However, the seasonally-adjusted CUR of 76.1% indicated a more limited deterioration than what the headline figures suggested. Business Confidence Index slipped to 111.0 in Feb’11 from 113.6 in Jan’11, on the back of the fall in total orders in the last three months and that in export orders for the next three months. Yet, the current level is still much higher than the critical threshold of 100 -- which separates the expansion and contraction periods in the economy -- thereby attesting to the ongoing economic growth. While being a negative surprise for growth outlook, it was definitely another source of relief for recent overheating concerns. CUR turned out much weaker than expected, driven by lower CUR in consumption and capital goods. Despite its being still relatively stronger on a seasonally-adjusted basis, weak CUR supports the CBT’s stance on the existence of a negative output gap (around 1% of GDP) in the economy. Business confidence index implies that the growth momentum is also losing some steam, probably reflecting the measures taken by the Central Bank and other authorities.
On the consumer side, available leading indicators of domestic demand (domestic car sales and white goods sales) were strong in January. However, more forward-looking indicators such as consumer confidence have somewhat weakened, due to a deterioration in expectations. Recognising the above-mentioned developments, the CBT also acknowledged early signs of a slowdown that are discernible through various channels. The CBT sees an improvement in the current account deficit in December in seasonally-adjusted terms, as well as a slight deceleration in the pace of credit growth at the beginning of 2011. The monetary authority also indicates that monetary tightening would restrain demand side pressures on inflation, by citing that domestic orders have moderated during the first quarter compared to the previous quarter, according to leading indicators (business confidence sub index).
For the time being, the final supporting factor is the favourable performance of the central government budget in January. The budget posted a TRL4.81bn primary surplus in Jan’11, compared to a TRL2.97bn primary surplus in Jan’10, up 62% yoy. Similarly, a TRL1bn budget surplus was recorded in Jan’11, versus TRL3.1bn deficit in the same month last year. Budget revenues rose by 20.4% yoy, thanks to solid performances in both tax and non-tax revenues. On the other hand, budget expenditures declined by 0.7% yoy, thanks to lower interest expenses in Jan’11. Otherwise, non-interest expenditures rose by 12.9% yoy, at a slightly slower pace than the tax revenues. It was really a good start to 2011 in terms of fiscal discipline ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for June’11. 12-month rolling budget figures imply that the primary balance improved slightly to 1% of the GDP from 0.8% of the GDP, while the budget deficit declined from 3.6% of the GDP to 3.2% of the GDP. Excluding one-off factors such as privatisation revenues, the primary balance also shows about 0.1pp improvement as a percentage of the GDP.
All in all, these signals bode well for the success of the CBT’s recent strategy. However, we agree with the CBT that the available data are not long enough to make a healthy assessment, as the effects of the measures would be observed more significantly with some lag.
Therefore, we think the CBT is seemingly trying to buy time before making any adjustments to the policy mix. However, the CBT also sees early signs of a slowdown and expects a further deceleration in economic activity. This should suggest that the CBT would be in no hurry to further increase the reserve requirement ratios (RRRs) or would be even more likely to hold them at current levels for a longer period, in case the impact of the measures became more visible. We maintain our expectation of a 100bp policy rate hike in 4Q and a 150bp RRR hike (weighted average) in the first half of the year. However, if the “slowdown” scenario pans out, this would lessen the chances of further RRR hikes and render the policy rate decision dependent more on inflation outlook than before.
On the other hand, we see a slight downside risk (*) to our GDP growth forecast of 6%for 2011, to which the current weakness in leading indicators would pose a threat should it evolve into a trend. We also see a limited upside risk to our CPI forecast of 6.2% for 2011, as oil prices are hovering about US$10-15 above our assumption. Our back of the envelope calculations suggest that the direct impact of every US$5 increase in average oil prices would be a 0.2pp rise in annual inflation. It would also mean a US$4.8-7.2bn (**) addition to our C/A deficit forecast of US$57.0bn, if the recent elevated oil price levels are sustained.
(*) In 2011, we assume seasonally-adjusted m/m changes in industrial production (IP) as 0.3% on average after a likely retreat of 2-3% m/m in January due to the sharp improvement in December. We think our assumption is very conservative, since average m/m changes were 0.8% and 1.4% in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Based on our calculations, even with this moderate improvement in industrial production, GDP growth could easily reach or even slightly exceed 6% in 2011.
(**) Oil and derivatives imports (US$21bn) constitute 54.5% of total energy imports (US$38.5bn) in 2010. Natural gas and solid fuels comprise the remainder. For simplicity, we assumed similar price increases in those segments. Oil and derivatives imports rise by around US$1.3bn in every US$10 increase in average oil prices
21 Ocak 2011 Cuma
Fiscal impulse, monetary response - not so straightforward
Careful readers might recall that I warned here about the probable poor performance of the central government budget in December. As a matter of fact, in December alone, there was a gigantic 16.1 billion-Turkish Lira deficit mainly due to high capital spending. However, despite this outlier, the central government budget produced a 39.6 billion-lira deficit in 2010 (3.6 percent of gross domestic product), pointing to a better performance than the revised official estimate of 44.2 billion liras (4 percent of GDP) deficit. It can also be seen as a relative success in today’s world full of debt and budget problems.
On the other hand, economy officials have long said they would allocate the strong revenue performance especially to investment expenditures rather than saving it. Therefore, the deterioration in the budget was well-telegraphed and came even later than envisaged. In my opinion, it is related to the aim of the full utilization of 2010 appropriations. In other words, the steep advance in expenditures is a result of a year-end factor and does not imply a permanent acceleration. However, for many analysts this was an excuse for changing the rate cut call by citing the Central Bank’s possible caution after these results. Although I give more weight to the “on hold” decision, I do not see any impact from that factor on the Central Bank verdict, as the Central Bank probably has the knowledge of this spending increase beforehand.
For the outlook of fiscal discipline going forward, I still think the strong economic activity should keep supporting the revenues side of the budget. The official target for the 2011 year-end budget deficit of 2.8 percent implies some narrowing in the budget deficit, which is currently at 3.6 percent. However, this improvement is planned to be backed by higher privatization revenues and lower interest payments. This means neither tightening nor loosening in the fiscal discipline in 2011 compared to 2010.
When doves cry
By the time I wrote today’s article, the markets were anxiously waiting for the Central Bank decision. The Central Bank had cut rates by 50 basis points at last month's meeting and many analysts had been pricing in a further cut initially. However, those expectations have waned over the last weeks as the lira has weakened and a majority of analysts think rates will remain on hold. While expectations of no change in the policy rate have been the main theme lately, a contradicting decision is not totally ruled out. Whatever the decision, the Central Bank should make sure that it will not be perceived as “dovish” this time. Gov. Durmuş Yılmaz also acknowledged this by saying: "I don't want to leave this impression that the Central Bank is aiming at a monetary policy of easing. That is not the case. The target that the bank wants to reach is a tighter monetary policy," during a Euromoney conference in Vienna on Tuesday. Yılmaz also said the Central Bank cut interest rates last month to curb the inflow of hot money into the economy and added that its policies were aimed at reducing domestic demand.
Mind the unemployment gap
As a lagging indicator of economic recovery, the unemployment rate continued to come down to levels not seen since October 2008. According to the latest data available, the unemployment rate declined to 11.2 percent, and in the non-farm sectors to 14.1 percent, from 13 percent and 16.4 percent a year ago. While this sharp decline is related to a crisis-hit base term, seasonally adjusted figures also show that the labor market conditions recovered from their weak performance in the previous months. The leading indicators, like consumer and real sector confidence and industrial production, suggest that the economic activity is to strengthen in the fourth quarter of 2010. Thus the labor market conditions will likely improve going forward. However, this would not be strong enough to cause any wage pressure, bearing in mind the still-high unemployment rate and population growth rate of 1.1 percent. Before the global crisis, the long-term unemployment rate average was around 10 percent. That is to say, there is still room for improvement before the full closure of the unemployment gap.
On the other hand, economy officials have long said they would allocate the strong revenue performance especially to investment expenditures rather than saving it. Therefore, the deterioration in the budget was well-telegraphed and came even later than envisaged. In my opinion, it is related to the aim of the full utilization of 2010 appropriations. In other words, the steep advance in expenditures is a result of a year-end factor and does not imply a permanent acceleration. However, for many analysts this was an excuse for changing the rate cut call by citing the Central Bank’s possible caution after these results. Although I give more weight to the “on hold” decision, I do not see any impact from that factor on the Central Bank verdict, as the Central Bank probably has the knowledge of this spending increase beforehand.
For the outlook of fiscal discipline going forward, I still think the strong economic activity should keep supporting the revenues side of the budget. The official target for the 2011 year-end budget deficit of 2.8 percent implies some narrowing in the budget deficit, which is currently at 3.6 percent. However, this improvement is planned to be backed by higher privatization revenues and lower interest payments. This means neither tightening nor loosening in the fiscal discipline in 2011 compared to 2010.
When doves cry
By the time I wrote today’s article, the markets were anxiously waiting for the Central Bank decision. The Central Bank had cut rates by 50 basis points at last month's meeting and many analysts had been pricing in a further cut initially. However, those expectations have waned over the last weeks as the lira has weakened and a majority of analysts think rates will remain on hold. While expectations of no change in the policy rate have been the main theme lately, a contradicting decision is not totally ruled out. Whatever the decision, the Central Bank should make sure that it will not be perceived as “dovish” this time. Gov. Durmuş Yılmaz also acknowledged this by saying: "I don't want to leave this impression that the Central Bank is aiming at a monetary policy of easing. That is not the case. The target that the bank wants to reach is a tighter monetary policy," during a Euromoney conference in Vienna on Tuesday. Yılmaz also said the Central Bank cut interest rates last month to curb the inflow of hot money into the economy and added that its policies were aimed at reducing domestic demand.
Mind the unemployment gap
As a lagging indicator of economic recovery, the unemployment rate continued to come down to levels not seen since October 2008. According to the latest data available, the unemployment rate declined to 11.2 percent, and in the non-farm sectors to 14.1 percent, from 13 percent and 16.4 percent a year ago. While this sharp decline is related to a crisis-hit base term, seasonally adjusted figures also show that the labor market conditions recovered from their weak performance in the previous months. The leading indicators, like consumer and real sector confidence and industrial production, suggest that the economic activity is to strengthen in the fourth quarter of 2010. Thus the labor market conditions will likely improve going forward. However, this would not be strong enough to cause any wage pressure, bearing in mind the still-high unemployment rate and population growth rate of 1.1 percent. Before the global crisis, the long-term unemployment rate average was around 10 percent. That is to say, there is still room for improvement before the full closure of the unemployment gap.
14 Ocak 2011 Cuma
Central Bank in the center of volatility...
The mood in the financial markets has turned decidedly sour over the last few weeks amid a welter of disappointing economic news from around the world. The U.S. is in the center of this pessimism – first the home sales data and then the non-farm payrolls surprised on the downside and erased hopes for an early recovery in the U.S.
In the EU, weak growth outlook persists, accompanied by debates over the feasibility of a credible post-crisis mechanism. It seems that the volatility in the markets would likely remain high or even get higher due to both global and local developments. Globally, the weak recovery pace in developed markets would likely be of main concern. Locally, the Central Bank of Turkey’s new monetary policy toolbox to fulfill the dual mandate of low inflation and financial stability would add to the short-term uncertainty and thus the general volatility. For instance, currently the market is mostly expecting a 50 basis point cut at the next meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, or MPC, on Jan. 20. However, it doesn’t seem to be a done deal, bearing in mind the currency depreciation recently.
As I’ve mentioned here before, policy rates currently appear to be a function of the short-term fund flows, thus the fluctuations in the level of currency should also be considered. The portfolio inflows have slowed down in December and there seems to be a global risk aversion tendency, which is pushing the currency rates higher in Turkey, beyond some very important technical resistance levels. If this tendency is to be preserved till the next Monetary Policy Committee meeting, then the Central Bank may opt to wait a bit longer before cutting rates further. If really it is the case, the Central Bank may preserve this tool for the times when the portfolio inflows intensify and lead to sharp currency appreciation.
On the other ingredient of policy mix, namely the reserve requirement ratio, the Central Bank relies on this old-fashioned tool to slow down the credit growth, which is considered to be highly correlated with the current account deficit. While the consensus expectation for the deficit points to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2010, the Central Bank says that the credit growth should be limited to 25 percent in order to attain a current account deficit level of 5.4 percent of GDP in 2011. The current trend of credit growth is at 40 percent and it would definitely necessitate more reserve requirement rises in order to attain such a slowdown. So I expect the Central Bank to hike the reserve requirement of foreign exchange liabilities this month (more on short-term liabilities again), but also consider more rises on Turkish Lira liabilities in the following months.
Permanent bears
In November, the current account deficit hit a record $5.9 billion. Also, the 12-month cumulative deficit increased to $44.9 billion, from $40.8 billion in the previous month. I expect that the deficit will continue to expand, reaching $46.6 billion in 2010 (6.2 percent of GDP). In my opinion, for an energy-hungry country the deficit is structural and Turkey is no stranger to large current account deficits. However, although I have been following the Turkish economy for many years, I still do not understand the real cause of concern of some market pundits. Is it the deficit, its financing or the quality of financing? This time they put forward the dominance of short-term portfolio inflows in the financing of the current account deficit as a cause of concern. But I remember very well that the same pundits were worried in 2008 as well when the financing was coming from long-term items such as foreign direct investment and long-term loans. Now I understand that there is no way to dispel all worries of some pundits because they are permanent bears.
Early signs of pre-election spending?
Early indicator of the budget performance, The Treasury’s cash-based budget produced a bulky 11.2 billion-lira non-interest deficit in December. The surge in the non-interest expenditures was the key reason behind the weak performance. However, this was not uncommon, as every December points to similar expansion in expenditures. Besides, based on these cash figures, the central government budget deficit to GDP ratio would be slightly above 3 percent in 2010, much below the revised official estimate at 4 percent in the Medium Term Fiscal Program.
In the EU, weak growth outlook persists, accompanied by debates over the feasibility of a credible post-crisis mechanism. It seems that the volatility in the markets would likely remain high or even get higher due to both global and local developments. Globally, the weak recovery pace in developed markets would likely be of main concern. Locally, the Central Bank of Turkey’s new monetary policy toolbox to fulfill the dual mandate of low inflation and financial stability would add to the short-term uncertainty and thus the general volatility. For instance, currently the market is mostly expecting a 50 basis point cut at the next meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, or MPC, on Jan. 20. However, it doesn’t seem to be a done deal, bearing in mind the currency depreciation recently.
As I’ve mentioned here before, policy rates currently appear to be a function of the short-term fund flows, thus the fluctuations in the level of currency should also be considered. The portfolio inflows have slowed down in December and there seems to be a global risk aversion tendency, which is pushing the currency rates higher in Turkey, beyond some very important technical resistance levels. If this tendency is to be preserved till the next Monetary Policy Committee meeting, then the Central Bank may opt to wait a bit longer before cutting rates further. If really it is the case, the Central Bank may preserve this tool for the times when the portfolio inflows intensify and lead to sharp currency appreciation.
On the other ingredient of policy mix, namely the reserve requirement ratio, the Central Bank relies on this old-fashioned tool to slow down the credit growth, which is considered to be highly correlated with the current account deficit. While the consensus expectation for the deficit points to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2010, the Central Bank says that the credit growth should be limited to 25 percent in order to attain a current account deficit level of 5.4 percent of GDP in 2011. The current trend of credit growth is at 40 percent and it would definitely necessitate more reserve requirement rises in order to attain such a slowdown. So I expect the Central Bank to hike the reserve requirement of foreign exchange liabilities this month (more on short-term liabilities again), but also consider more rises on Turkish Lira liabilities in the following months.
Permanent bears
In November, the current account deficit hit a record $5.9 billion. Also, the 12-month cumulative deficit increased to $44.9 billion, from $40.8 billion in the previous month. I expect that the deficit will continue to expand, reaching $46.6 billion in 2010 (6.2 percent of GDP). In my opinion, for an energy-hungry country the deficit is structural and Turkey is no stranger to large current account deficits. However, although I have been following the Turkish economy for many years, I still do not understand the real cause of concern of some market pundits. Is it the deficit, its financing or the quality of financing? This time they put forward the dominance of short-term portfolio inflows in the financing of the current account deficit as a cause of concern. But I remember very well that the same pundits were worried in 2008 as well when the financing was coming from long-term items such as foreign direct investment and long-term loans. Now I understand that there is no way to dispel all worries of some pundits because they are permanent bears.
Early signs of pre-election spending?
Early indicator of the budget performance, The Treasury’s cash-based budget produced a bulky 11.2 billion-lira non-interest deficit in December. The surge in the non-interest expenditures was the key reason behind the weak performance. However, this was not uncommon, as every December points to similar expansion in expenditures. Besides, based on these cash figures, the central government budget deficit to GDP ratio would be slightly above 3 percent in 2010, much below the revised official estimate at 4 percent in the Medium Term Fiscal Program.
7 Ocak 2011 Cuma
What happens if everyone expects the same thing in an economy?...
When I look at several macro scenarios for the Turkish economy in 2011being depicted by different financial institutions, I barely notice any difference. It looks as if optimism is finally the predominant attitude toward the economy, thanks to self-confidence-boosting developments in the Turkish economy during and after the global crisis. The averages of forecasts are also similar to my forecasts, which I presented here on Dec. 17, 2010.
Let me summarize the macro outlook:
1) GDP growth is likely to be at least 5 percent, probably in the broad range of 5.5 percent to 6.5 percent. 2) Headline CPI inflation will remain within the 6 percent to 7 percent range, after hitting the 4 percent to 5 percent range in the first quarter. 3) Current account deficit is likely to expand to $50-$55 billion range, depending on growth forecast, from an estimated $45 billion in 2010. 4) The fall in unemployment is likely to continue but with reduced momentum. The yearly average unemployment rate will remain around 11 percent, better than 2010 but significantly above pre-crisis levels. 5) Budget deficit and non-interest balances are likely to improve further despite the general elections likely to be held in June. 6) There is a big chance the Turkish economy could be upgraded to investment grade in 2011. Such a rating would improve Turkey’s risk profile, bolstering long-term loans and foreign direct investment.
However, the convergence of views does not make me more comfortable. I still wonder whether this big consensus is really healthy. Actually, it means every market player is on the same side and this limits market fluctuations. It is definitely good for financial stability, but it also makes positions more exposed to macro data surprises in both directions.
On the other hand, there is certainly less consensus about financial indicators, especially the Central Bank policy rate path – although most analysts expect further rate cuts in the short-term. In that context, the first edition of quarterly inflation report from the Central Bank, due Jan. 25, will help shape a base scenario for the direction of rates in the medium-term on the policy horizon.
Yet another threshold from ratings agencies...
Could a rating upgrade be a Central Bank mission? Ratings agency Fitch thinks so. A Fitch Turkey analyst said Monday that Turkey's Central Bank faces a challenge to reduce inflation, prevent overheating and limit the current account deficit, and its success in managing this will feed into its rating assessment.
It is not an easy task. Though the headline consumer price index, or CPI, closed last year at 6.4 percent, below the year-end target of 6.5 percent, and I expect it to fall further to around 4 percent at the end of February – mainly due to favorable base effects generated by last year’s administrative (tax) price increases. However, from then on, the real challenge will be to keep the CPI below or around the 2011 target of 5.5 percent. In that context, the key variables are oil, unprocessed food prices and Turkish Lira depreciation (or appreciation). The first two are exogenous, but the last one will be tied to the monetary stance of the central bank. The easier the stance, the bigger the upward pressure on depreciation. Consequently, it is good for the current account, but not for inflation.
What is good for the country may not be good for the banks...
On the other side of the ledger, easy money could fuel a lending boom. In 2010, total growth in bank lending reached 30 percent. Moreover, the ratio of change in credit volume to GDP jumped by 11 percent. The Central Bank sees the difference between the system’s credit and deposit growth as a proxy to the private sector savings gap.
According to its calculations, all else (public sector savings gap, FDI and portfolio investments) being equal, a rise of 5 percentage points in the credit growth rate will increase the current account deficit by 2.1 points in any given year. Therefore, another strong growth spurt, as many bank CEOs aimed for in their 2011 plan, would make the CBT’s plan ineffective. That was the main motive behind the Central Bank’s warning to all banks to curb credit expansion to a level (at most 25 percent) consistent with macroeconomic targets of the Medium Term Program.
Let me summarize the macro outlook:
1) GDP growth is likely to be at least 5 percent, probably in the broad range of 5.5 percent to 6.5 percent. 2) Headline CPI inflation will remain within the 6 percent to 7 percent range, after hitting the 4 percent to 5 percent range in the first quarter. 3) Current account deficit is likely to expand to $50-$55 billion range, depending on growth forecast, from an estimated $45 billion in 2010. 4) The fall in unemployment is likely to continue but with reduced momentum. The yearly average unemployment rate will remain around 11 percent, better than 2010 but significantly above pre-crisis levels. 5) Budget deficit and non-interest balances are likely to improve further despite the general elections likely to be held in June. 6) There is a big chance the Turkish economy could be upgraded to investment grade in 2011. Such a rating would improve Turkey’s risk profile, bolstering long-term loans and foreign direct investment.
However, the convergence of views does not make me more comfortable. I still wonder whether this big consensus is really healthy. Actually, it means every market player is on the same side and this limits market fluctuations. It is definitely good for financial stability, but it also makes positions more exposed to macro data surprises in both directions.
On the other hand, there is certainly less consensus about financial indicators, especially the Central Bank policy rate path – although most analysts expect further rate cuts in the short-term. In that context, the first edition of quarterly inflation report from the Central Bank, due Jan. 25, will help shape a base scenario for the direction of rates in the medium-term on the policy horizon.
Yet another threshold from ratings agencies...
Could a rating upgrade be a Central Bank mission? Ratings agency Fitch thinks so. A Fitch Turkey analyst said Monday that Turkey's Central Bank faces a challenge to reduce inflation, prevent overheating and limit the current account deficit, and its success in managing this will feed into its rating assessment.
It is not an easy task. Though the headline consumer price index, or CPI, closed last year at 6.4 percent, below the year-end target of 6.5 percent, and I expect it to fall further to around 4 percent at the end of February – mainly due to favorable base effects generated by last year’s administrative (tax) price increases. However, from then on, the real challenge will be to keep the CPI below or around the 2011 target of 5.5 percent. In that context, the key variables are oil, unprocessed food prices and Turkish Lira depreciation (or appreciation). The first two are exogenous, but the last one will be tied to the monetary stance of the central bank. The easier the stance, the bigger the upward pressure on depreciation. Consequently, it is good for the current account, but not for inflation.
What is good for the country may not be good for the banks...
On the other side of the ledger, easy money could fuel a lending boom. In 2010, total growth in bank lending reached 30 percent. Moreover, the ratio of change in credit volume to GDP jumped by 11 percent. The Central Bank sees the difference between the system’s credit and deposit growth as a proxy to the private sector savings gap.
According to its calculations, all else (public sector savings gap, FDI and portfolio investments) being equal, a rise of 5 percentage points in the credit growth rate will increase the current account deficit by 2.1 points in any given year. Therefore, another strong growth spurt, as many bank CEOs aimed for in their 2011 plan, would make the CBT’s plan ineffective. That was the main motive behind the Central Bank’s warning to all banks to curb credit expansion to a level (at most 25 percent) consistent with macroeconomic targets of the Medium Term Program.
31 Aralık 2010 Cuma
Take away the punch bowl, serve up a policy cocktail...
Central Bank decisions and post-meeting communications have continued to dominate the economic agenda. Although I give the Central Bank the benefit of the doubt and will wait and see the results of recent decisions, it is clear that the policy rate cut accompanying the increased reserve requirement has generated reaction from some analysts who think price stability should be the overriding concern of a central bank. Since the expectations channel is vital for transmitting monetary policy to the real economy, inability to shape expectations as desired could be an obstacle to the effectiveness of the latest efforts. I think the Central Bank of Turkey got this message from market players. In return, the Central Bank is trying to convince decision-makers that the rate cut has nothing to do with the inflation outlook, which is very promising in the short term; it is indeed an element in a policy mix that has two main goals.
According to the Central Bank, the first goal of the current policy mix is reducing the pace of credit growth and the second goal is fostering longer maturity periods for capital inflows. It seems that a lower policy rate is very much related to the second goal of discouraging short-term capital inflows mainly in the form of swap transactions with non-residents. As a supplement to this, the Central Bank also widens the corridor between overnight borrowing and lending rates so as to allow fluctuations in the short-term interest rates when needed. As Central Bank Gov. Durmuş Yılmaz confirmed in a TV interview, this strategy was quite successful in driving away hot money and causing the recent depreciation of the Turkish Lira. I also saw from banks’ rapidly shrinking off-balance sheet transactions that it is actually happening. This is important for improving the quality of the capital account and avoiding exchange rate movements detached from economic fundamentals. However, it could also imply that another rate cut would not be needed if the second goal were accomplished. On the first goal, the Central Bank said higher effective required reserve ratios are anticipated to curb credit growth through the cost and liquidity channels starting from January. This means the composition and the direction of the policy instruments in the forthcoming period will be dependent on credit growth and capital flows data.
The Central Bank sent clear signals about the inflation outlook in the summary notes from its monetary policy meeting as an important part of its communication strategy. First, headline inflation is expected to be close to the end-2010 target of 6.5 percent. Second, inflation will decline in the forthcoming period. Third, the output gap still exists and will help to limit the pass-through from commodity prices to the prices of core goods and services. However, the bank remained cautious by highlighting the sharp increases in agricultural commodity prices (cotton and wheat) and the rapid pace of domestic demand. The bank said the impact of commodity prices on general price-setting behavior should be closely monitored.
Last but certainly not the least, the Central Bank clearly said the net impact of the macro-prudential policy package implemented – and to be implemented – both by itself and at other institutions should be on the tightening side. While this statement makes measuring the policy stance even more difficult, it also increases the importance of the Central Bank’s credibility. So it all depends on do you trust the bank or not?...
The Central Bank has been harshly criticized for not mentioning the importance of fiscal discipline in the fight against the current account deficit while bringing new burdens to the banking system. In the meeting notes, the Central Bank said increasing government savings is essential for containing the risks regarding the current account deficit and applauded the control of budget expenditures during 2010 as envisaged in the country’s medium-term program, while underlining the vitality of maintaining fiscal discipline in the period ahead.
According to the Central Bank, the first goal of the current policy mix is reducing the pace of credit growth and the second goal is fostering longer maturity periods for capital inflows. It seems that a lower policy rate is very much related to the second goal of discouraging short-term capital inflows mainly in the form of swap transactions with non-residents. As a supplement to this, the Central Bank also widens the corridor between overnight borrowing and lending rates so as to allow fluctuations in the short-term interest rates when needed. As Central Bank Gov. Durmuş Yılmaz confirmed in a TV interview, this strategy was quite successful in driving away hot money and causing the recent depreciation of the Turkish Lira. I also saw from banks’ rapidly shrinking off-balance sheet transactions that it is actually happening. This is important for improving the quality of the capital account and avoiding exchange rate movements detached from economic fundamentals. However, it could also imply that another rate cut would not be needed if the second goal were accomplished. On the first goal, the Central Bank said higher effective required reserve ratios are anticipated to curb credit growth through the cost and liquidity channels starting from January. This means the composition and the direction of the policy instruments in the forthcoming period will be dependent on credit growth and capital flows data.
The Central Bank sent clear signals about the inflation outlook in the summary notes from its monetary policy meeting as an important part of its communication strategy. First, headline inflation is expected to be close to the end-2010 target of 6.5 percent. Second, inflation will decline in the forthcoming period. Third, the output gap still exists and will help to limit the pass-through from commodity prices to the prices of core goods and services. However, the bank remained cautious by highlighting the sharp increases in agricultural commodity prices (cotton and wheat) and the rapid pace of domestic demand. The bank said the impact of commodity prices on general price-setting behavior should be closely monitored.
Last but certainly not the least, the Central Bank clearly said the net impact of the macro-prudential policy package implemented – and to be implemented – both by itself and at other institutions should be on the tightening side. While this statement makes measuring the policy stance even more difficult, it also increases the importance of the Central Bank’s credibility. So it all depends on do you trust the bank or not?...
The Central Bank has been harshly criticized for not mentioning the importance of fiscal discipline in the fight against the current account deficit while bringing new burdens to the banking system. In the meeting notes, the Central Bank said increasing government savings is essential for containing the risks regarding the current account deficit and applauded the control of budget expenditures during 2010 as envisaged in the country’s medium-term program, while underlining the vitality of maintaining fiscal discipline in the period ahead.
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